Many of the problems that the United States has faced since its invasion of Iraq in 
The new doctrine defined the population as the centre of gravity of military operations and insisted that protection of the civilian population take priority over force protection; it required 'adversary cultural knowledge' precisely because 'American ideas of what is "normal" or "rational" are not universal'; it demanded sympathetic 'immersion in the people and their lives' so that counterinsurgency involved not only 'kinetic' but also 'non-kinetic' (non-violent) military-political operations ('armed social work'); and it reaffirmed the obligations imposed by international humanitarian law on the treatment of civilians and combatants. 8 These formulations fed into revised Mission Rehearsal
Exercises and military simulations that paid close attention to cultural transactions and negotiations between troops and civilians.
The new doctrine has attracted considerable public acclaim. In part an attempt to re-position the US military, it has identified crucial ways to limit the horrors of war:
refusing the reduction of enemy space to an empty space; rejecting the de-humanization of adversaries; and rehabilitating the concept of the civilian. But to count these as major advances is also a measure of how far we have fallen. And to focus on doctrine and training is to limit discussion to the normative and the virtual, and to accept the tacit invitation to step through the back of the wardrobe into a martial Narnia where the US By July more than half the capital was declared 'under control', which did not mean that The first phase of the Iraq Planning Group's strategy had ruled out military operations in Sadr City because they would 'provoke a massive political and military conflagration', and instead advocated first securing Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighbourhoods. This 'accords with sound counterinsurgency practice,' the Report continued, 'which favors defensive strategies aimed at protecting the population over offensive strategies aimed at killing insurgents': Choosing Victory, p. Significantly, Petraeus's base-map remained unchanged throughout the sequence and yet, just days earlier, the equivalent base-maps used in the Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq showed Baghdad turning into an 24 This new sectarian landscape was not an autonomous production, and it involved many actors, but its erasure also artfully erases the involvement of the Bush administration and the US military in crystallizing these divisions. These two considerations bear directly on both the politics of the cultural turn and the biopolitics of Baghdad, and I will elaborate each of them in turn.
Sectarianism and the production of space in Baghdad
There are many cultural groups in Iraq, but I focus on the Sunni and Shia whose interactions have been instrumental in the restructuring of post-invasion Baghdad. In doing so, however, I do not mean to impose any essentialist identity on what is a complex cultural-historical field; identity is of course constructed and conjunctural, negotiated and contested, and subject-positions are formed at the intersection of multiple affiliations.
Indeed, many Iraqis insist that marriage between Sunni and Shia was common until very recently. Neither do I mean to treat violence as a pure expression of sectarian affiliation; on the contrary, it has been a significant means of manufacturing identity in Baghdad as
elsewhere. This has not been confined to divisions between the confessions. The Sunni and Shia are not homogeneous constituencies, and fissures within both communities have played an important part in the narrative of sectarian power. The term is as rebarbative as the process. It may be a literal translation of the SerboCroat etnicko ciscenje and was widely used to describe the systematic campaigns of terror unleashed on particular ethno-cultural groups during the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s: these included the destruction of homes and property, forcible expulsions and mass murders. Many fled in advance of the violence but these population displacements hardly qualify as voluntary. The practice has a longer history, and the term has since been used to describe the expulsion of any ethno-cultural group by force or intimidation in order to homogenize the population of a territory. It differs from genocide inasmuch as its objective is to force a group to flee rather than seek its physical elimination, and it has been recognised under international law This spare narrative is only a caricature, but it serves to show that the shifting antagonism between the Sunni and Shia was not primarily cultural: it was, rather, a political conflict over the right to rule Iraq, to share in its resources and to define the meaning of the nationalist project. 25 In fact, this is consistent with the original schism between Sunni and Shia, which was not so much a theological as a political dispute over the nomination of the Prophet's successor as caliph and ruler of the Islamic state.
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In post-invasion Iraq ethno-sectarian violence became a means of communication,
and there was no shortage of iconic episodes. In understanding what came to be called (New York: Scribner, 2008) . 26 After Muhammed's death, those who believed that his successor should be selected by consultation favoured the Prophet's close friend and adviser, Abu Bakr, and were identified as Sunni (loosely, 'one who follows the traditions of the Prophet'), while those who insisted that the successor should be chosen from the Prophet's own family preferred Muhammed's son-in-law, Ali, and came to be identified as the Shia-t-Ali (hence Shia) or 'the party of Ali'. for a second ground attack gathered momentum, the city turned into a symbol of division.
On one side, the failure of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading Shia cleric, to condemn the attack was widely seen as a tacit endorsement of it and a disavowal of the increasingly violent tactics of Sunni insurgent groups, especially AQI, and estrangement was increased still further by the participation of units of the reformed Iraqi Army that were predominantly Shia. On the other side, Sunni Arabs increasingly dominated the insurgency, which redoubled its attacks on the Iraqi Army and police whose ranks were disproportionately filled by Shia, and AQI escalated its attacks on the coalition ('the far enemy') and on the Shia population at large ('the near enemy'). These were two sides of the same coin, each serving to increase the political currency of the other, and they soon after the elections they started to seize sectors of the state apparatus including, Sunni insurgents forced Shia residents to flee Amiriyah, Dora, Ghaziliyah and Sadiya;
Shia mosques were closed, houses left empty, and the west bank seemed to be becoming the preserve of the Sunni, while in a mirror reflection across the Tigris, Shia death squads and militias ensured that the east bank was becoming the preserve of the Shia. It was now the turn of Shia refugees to pour into Baghdad, and in the days after the bombing dozens of Sunni mosques in the capital were burned or taken over by armed fighters, and 1,300 bodies (mostly Sunni) were dumped in and around the city: often burned and mutilated, they were intended to send a viscerally sectarian message. fight was over control of the corridors into the city from the north (by the Shia) and the south (by the Sunni), and each side sought to secure its territory by advancing through a corresponding arc of neighbourhoods. 36 Homi Bhabha reminds us that the root of 'territory' is the same as 'terror', so that it literally means a place from which people have been frightened away. 37 While many people fled the violence voluntarily, particularly the middle class, often leaving not only the capital but also the country to seek refuge in Syria or Jordan, many others were subject to systematic campaigns of intimidation:
Arrest by Iraqi security forces or their militias 'would mean possible death or injury', they began, and it would be 'naïve' to trust them; residents were advised to seek out 'trustworthy friends', to become familiar with the geography of their neighbourhoods, and to establish 'neighbourhood watch groups' so that when a patrol entered (usually a 4WD without number plates) people could be warned by telephone to hide or escape. By November it was clear that the Shia had gained the upper hand, and were making significant inroads into both the north-west and south-west of the city. Online message boards were full of frantic postings from Sunni residents asking for help in defending their neighbourhoods and providing frequent updates on their local situation.
A staccato sample translated by Zeyad Kasim captures the frightening cadence of ethnic cleansing:
• 'Please inform us about the areas that are expected to be targeted so we can be prepared';
• 'Please intervene to save the Jihad district from another massacre -Interior
Ministry commandos have been transporting fighters and mercenaries from the militias with their buses to their headquarters in the district';
• 'Deploy snipers on the rooftops of buildings that lie close to the main entry points
for each area… RPG carriers should maintain their positions on side streets';
• 'Dora has been breached';
• 'Elements of the Interior Ministry are attacking Dora… But do not fear, for we are engaging them';
• 'Urgent. The residents of Ghazaliya are in urgent need for medical supplies';
• 'Please inform us how the Shia pray because this will save many from being killed during interrogation after they are abducted.' Contemplating this stark geometry, Brian Finoki wrote that At the end of June Kazim posted one of many e-mails circulating on message boards and list-servers classifying neighbourhoods according to the danger of JAM or AQI activity. The lists have their own morbid humour -a 'safe area' was defined as one where the probability of staying alive was 50 per cent -but they also have a hard edge, and the geography of risk that they describe was, as Kazim noted, 'quite different' from those found in official statements from the Iraqi government or the US military ( Figure   6 ). 
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Embedded in these mental maps was a new geography of the killing fields. As a neighbourhood was cleansed so it became a target for renewed mortar attacks, since each side could be more confident it would not be killing members of its own community; bodies continued to be dumped on the streets, especially on the west bank, in most cases bound, blindfold and executed, but as the Battle for Baghdad reached its tense climax so killings were less about sending messages to others and the death squads started to conceal the bodies of their victims in shallow graves.
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The area under the control of the Mahdi Army continued to expand until August
2007, which would have been impossible without its penetration of the Ministry of the
Interior and the collaboration of Iraq's security forces. 48 As with the other militias, the advance of the Mahdi Army through Baghdad was about the pursuit of political and economic power. 'Control equals money and power,' one military officer told two reporters, and the more neighbourhoods a militia controls then the more influence it will have 'through legal and non-legal means.' 49 Politically these territorial gains were of immense symbolic significance. This was, after all, the capital city. In the 1940s and 1950s, before thousands of poor Shia moved to the newly built suburb of al Thawa (renamed Saddam City and eventually Sadr City), Baghdad was perhaps 90 per cent Sunni. Now, in just two or three years, it had become 75 per cent Shia ( Figure 6 ). 
The original maps were drawn for MNF-I by Mike Azady and were based on censuses carried out by the US military. Such exercises are of course fraught with difficulty and, in the circumstances, danger for the respondents. They form part of 'mapping the human terrain', a central element in the new counterinsurgency doctrine, but some commanders have claimed that the initial counts were inaccurate so that ethnic cleansing in some neighbourhoods was significantly over-or under-estimated. There have also been repeated calls to automate census operations, incorporating biometric identifiers and thereby enabling the production of a consistent and integrated date-base. As is common in 'new wars' more generally, these activities shaded into outright criminality. The diminution of ethno-sectarian violence was thus, in large measure, the climax and consequence of a campaign of ethno-sectarian violence. It was not until Petraeus's Farrell had concluded from their survey of Baghdad neighbourhoods that the Surge had not reversed 'the city's underlying sectarian dynamics', but this was only half the story.
For that same week Tina Susman noted that Baghdad 'appears to have become more balkanized, not less, in the last six months.' 61 In fact, far from reversing sectarian dynamics, as I now want to show, the security plan actively exploited them.
Divide and rule
That the Baghdad Security Plan should have had a sectarian inflection is hardly First, the detention and treatment of prisoners was by no means blind to sectarian affiliation. The operational title for the Plan, 'Operation Imposing the Law', is revealing. Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) complained that its 'longstanding concerns with respect to due process rights' of prisoners in US military custody remained unaddressed, and that a high proportion continued to be held in military detention even after the courts had dismissed their cases. In relation to those held by the Government of Iraq, UNAMI reaffirmed its concerns over 'prolonged delays in delays in reviewing detainee cases; the lack of timely and adequate defence counsel for suspects; the failure to promptly investigate credible allegations of torture and to institute criminal proceedings against officials responsible the west bank, but they had also spread to the largest remaining Sunni neighbourhood on the east bank (Adhamiya). Once recruits had been screened, recorded on a biometric database and signed a security contract they were paid $300 a month by the US military the new counterinsurgency manual promised that it could now be done 'with much more cultural sensitivity'). 73 The first neighbourhood to be walled was Adhamiya, which Petraeus's Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser described as both a staging post for AQI bomb attacks on surrounding Shia communities and a recurrent target for revenge attacks by Shia death squads. 74 Many residents were unconvinced by the strategy, however, and ! 35! built deep inside the occupied West Bank. They complained that like the Palestinians they were being turned into 'caged animals'. 75 The sentiment and the structure of feeling that it represented were widely shared, and there was considerable opposition to the construction of the wall, from the press, on the streets and even, for a brief moment, from the Iraqi Prime Minister. One young Iraqi woman must have spoken for many when she wrote: 'The Wall is the latest effort to further break Iraqi society apart. Promoting and supporting civil war isn't enough, apparently… It's time for America to physically divide and conquer.' 76 The military brushed aside the protests, however, insisting that they had been orchestrated by AQI, and claimed that it was not 'sealing off neighbourhoods' but merely 'controlling access to them.' Although the military referred to these walled enclaves as 'gated communities', Baghdad was hardly Bel Air. Access was restricted to military checkpoints -'One road in and one road out,' said one sad man in Ghazaliya:
'Now I live in my own little prison' 77 -and all residents were subjected to biometric scanning (fingerprints and retinal scans). 78 As with the militias, so the miles of concrete walls represent a suspension rather than a resolution of the conflict between the Sunni and the Shia. As James Denselow argued in commentary on the walling of Baghdad, behind so much of the supposed progress in Iraq 'is a systematic attempt to transfer the conflict into a deep freeze rather than address the root causes of the violence.' Baghdad, but face-to-face interactions have become less frequent: one man said his favourite aunts and cousins lived in Dora, less than two miles away from his home in Saydia, but he had been unable to visit them for over a year. Ordinary activities like 
Biopolitics, security and the counter-city
In his original discussions, Foucault described sovereign power and bio-power as 'absolutely incompatible', because one was exercised over territory, the other over bodies late modern security dispositif that is not only geopolitical but also profoundly biopolitical.
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The biopolitical disposition is revealed most acutely in the doctrinal description of three stages of counterinsurgency:
• 'Stop the bleeding': 'similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents' initiative and set the conditions for further engagement.'
• 'Inpatient care -recovery': 'Efforts aimed at assisting the patient through longterm recovery or restoration of health -which in this case means achieving stability … through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations'
• 'Outpatient care -movement to self-sufficiency': 'expansion of stability operations across contexts regions, ideally using HN ['Host Nation'] forces.'
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Counterinsurgency is made to appear intrinsically therapeutic so that, when it moves to the concrete, the walling of Baghdad neighbourhoods becomes the military equivalent of 'tourniquets in surgery', temporary measures to stop a 'life-threatening haemorrhage'.
These medicalized metaphors become even more powerful once they circulate through the public sphere, and whatever the effects of the Baghdad Security Plan on the people Following Foucault, Dillon identifies geopolitics with territory and biopolitics with population, but both involve spatializations. Foucault made it clear that 'problems of space' were common to all three apparatuses of power with which he was concerned. 'It goes without saying for sovereignty, since sovereignty is first of all exercised within a territory. But discipline involves a spatial division, and I think security does too, and the different treatment of space by sovereignty, discipline and security is precisely what I want to talk about': Security, territory, population, p. 12. 
